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Abstract
In fair division problems, we are given a set S of m items and a set N of n agents with
individual preferences, and the goal is to find an allocation of items among agents so that each
agent finds the allocation fair. There are several established fairness concepts and envy-freeness
is one of the most extensively studied ones. However envy-free allocations do not always exist
when items are indivisible and this has motivated relaxations of envy-freeness: envy-freeness up
to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) are two well-studied relaxations.
We consider the problem of finding EF1 and EFX allocations for utility functions that are not
necessarily monotone, and propose four possible extensions of different strength to this setting.
In particular, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an EF1 allocation for two
agents with arbitrary utility functions. An example is given showing that EFX allocations need
not exist for two agents with non-monotone, non-additive, identical utility functions. However,
when all agents have monotone (not necessarily additive) identical utility functions, we prove
that an EFX allocation of chores always exists. As a step toward understanding the general
case, we discuss two subclasses of utility functions: Boolean utilities that are {0,+1}-valued
functions, and negative Boolean utilities that are {0,−1}-valued functions. For the latter, we
give a polynomial time algorithm that finds an EFX allocation when the utility functions are
identical.
Keywords: Fair division, Indivisible items, Envy-freeness, EF1, EFX, Non-monotone utility
function, Non-additive utility function
1 Introduction
Fair division of items among competing agents is an important and well-studied problem in Eco-
nomics and Computer Science. There is a set S of m indivisible items and a set N of n agents
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with individual preferences, and the goal is to find an allocation of items among agents so that each
agent finds the allocation fair. There are several fairness concepts in the literature that use different
metrics to measure the degree of equity or fairness. Among them, the possibly most compelling
one is envy-freeness (EF). Every agent has a utility value for each subset of items: the i-th agent
has a utility function ui : 2
S → R. An allocation is envy-free if each agent finds the utility of her
bundle at least as much as that of any other agent. Although envy-freeness provides a very natural
criterion for the fairness of an allocation, such a solution rarely exists as shown by the following
simple example: just consider an instance with two agents and a single item having positive utility
for both of them. In order to circumvent the possible non-existence of envy-free allocations, two
natural relaxations of envy-freeness have been studied.
In the setting where all utilities are non-negative (items are called goods in such a case) Lipton
et al. [30] and Budish [16] introduced the notion of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) which
allows the presence of envies between agents – however any envy must be removable by deleting
some good from the envied agent’s bundle. Note that no good is really removed from the envied
agent’s bundle, this is just a thought experiment to measure the amount of envy the envious agent
has towards the envied agent.
EF1 may seem too weak as a relaxation of envy-freeness. Consider the simple example given
below where there are three goods a, b, c and two agents with additive1 utilities. Both agents value
c twice as much as a or b. The allocation where agent 1 gets {a} and agent 2 gets {b, c} is EF1 –
however this allocation does not seem fair towards agent 1.
a b c
Agent 1 1 1 2
Agent 2 1 1 2
As a less permissive relaxation, Caragiannis et al. [19] proposed envy-freeness up to any good
(EFX), which requires that an agent’s envy towards another bundle can be eliminated by removing
any good from the envied bundle. Observe the subtle difference between the above definitions:
when utility functions are additive, EF1 requires that for any pair of agents i, j agent i’s envy
towards agent j can be eliminated by removing agent i’s most valued good from agent j’s bundle,
while EFX requires that the same should hold even after removing agent i’s least valued good from
agent j’s bundle. In the example given above, the allocation where one agent gets {a, b} and the
other agent gets {c} is the only EFX allocation. Thus EFX, though strictly weaker than EF, is
strictly stronger than EF1. As remarked in [17]: “Arguably, EFX is the best fairness analog of
envy-freeness of indivisible items”.
Most works on fair division focused on allocation of ‘goods’, i.e., utilities are always non-negative
and monotone: the utility of any set is at least as much as each of its subsets. However, in practice,
it might easily happen that an item is a chore, i.e., this is a task or responsibility that all agents find
cumbersome, so the utility of a chore is zero or negative – hence utilities are no longer monotone.
We can also have mixed items: so an item has positive utility for some agent and negative for
another agent. Furthermore, the utility functions are not necessarily additive, hence the utility of
a subset of items might be completely independent of the utilities of the individual items within.
1For additive utilities, the utility of a subset X of items is the sum of utilities of items in X.
2
Aziz et al. [5] initiated the study of fair allocations of indivisible goods and chores and extended
the above fairness concepts to deal with chores, mixed items and more general utility functions. Our
work continues to discover this direction by showing the existence or non-existence of fair solutions
in various settings. We also focus on the setting where all items are chores: so all utilities are
non-positive here. As in the case of goods, envy-free allocations of chores need not exist. Consider
the simple example with two agents and a single chore that neither agent wants to do: one of the
agents has to be assigned this chore and she envies the other agent who is assigned no chore.
We formally define EF1 and EFX allocations in the generalized setting of goods and chores in
Section 2. Roughly speaking, an allocation pi = 〈pi(1), . . . , pi(n)〉 is EF1 if for any pair of agents
i, j: either (1) i does not envy j’s bundle, or (2) there is some item s ∈ pi(i)∪ pi(j) such that i likes
pi(i)−s at least as much as pi(j)−s. Similarly, pi is EFX if for any pair of agents i, j: (1) i does not
envy j’s bundle, or (2) i likes pi(i) at least as much as pi(j)− s for any ‘good’ s ∈ pi(j) and i likes
pi(i) − s at least as much as pi(j) for any ‘chore’ s ∈ pi(i). Note that in the general case, whether
an item s is a good or chore in X ⊆ S is determined by the marginal utility that s brings to the
set X − s. We refer to Section 2 for details.
1.1 Previous Work
We only discuss works that are closely related to our results, for a detailed survey of the fair division
literature we refer the reader to [14,15].
EF1 allocations. Envy-freeness and its relaxations were mainly considered for monotone additive
utility functions. The idea of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) implicitly appeared in the paper
of Lipton et al. [30], and then was explicitly introduced and analyzed by Budish [16].
When allocating divisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare solution selects an allocation that
maximizes the product of utilities and it is known to have strong fairness guarantees; moreover it
also satisfies Pareto optimality.2 Caragiannis et al. [19] showed that the maximum Nash welfare
solution is fair in the indivisible setting as well – in the sense that it forms an EF1 allocation. In [9],
Barman et al. developed a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for finding EF1 allocations of goods
that are also Pareto efficient, and showed that there always exists an allocation that is EF1 and
fractionally Pareto efficient.
Much less is known when the utility functions are non-additive or non-monotone. Caragiannis
et al. [18] considered allocation problems in which a set of divisible or indivisible goods or chores has
to be allocated among several agents. Aziz et al. [3] focused on additive cardinal utility functions,
and presented computational hardness results as well as polynomial-time algorithms for testing
Pareto optimality for subclasses of utility functions. Barman and Murthy [8] considered additive
and submodular utilities for goods, and provided fairness guarantees in terms of the maximin
share, i.e., the maximum value that an agent can ensure for herself by partitioning the goods into
n bundles, and receiving a minimum valued bundle. Benabbou et al. [10] considered the allocation
of indivisible goods to agents that have monotone, submodular, non-additive utility functions.
They showed that utilitarian socially optimal (hence Pareto optimal), leximin, and maximum Nash
welfare allocations are all EF1 if in addition the utility functions have binary marginal gain.
2An allocation is Pareto optimal if there is no other allocation which makes some agent strictly better off while
making no agent worse off.
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Bogomolnaia et al. [12] compared the performance of the Competitive and the Egalitarian
division rules for problems involving divisible goods and chores. Recently, Aziz et al. [5] proposed
a similar scenario in the indivisible setting, and gave a generalization of the decentralized round
robin algorithm that finds an EF1 allocation when the utilities are additive. They also presented a
different polynomial-time algorithm that returns an EF1 allocation even when the utility functions
are arbitrary. However, there is a flaw in the proof of the latter result, thus the existence of an EF1
allocation in the non-monotone, non-additive setting is still open even for identical utility functions.
Utilities
Additive Non-additive
Monotone Non-monotone Monotone Non-monotone
Identical
Exists [30] Exists [5] Exists [30]
Open
n = 2 (Thm. 1)
Boolean (Thm. 5)
Neg. Boolean (Thm. 6)
Non-
identical
Open
n = 2 (Thm. 1)
Boolean (Thm. 5)
Table 1: Landscape of results on EF1 allocations, where bold letters represents the results obtained
in the present paper. A utility function u is called Boolean if u(X) ∈ {0, 1} for every X ⊆ S, and
negative Boolean if −u is Boolean.
EFX allocations. As a strictly stronger fairness criterion than EF1, [19] introduced envy-freeness
up to any good (EFX) and provided a connection to pairwise maximum share guarantee for additive
utilities over indivisible goods. Plaut and Roughgarden [31] investigated a stronger variant of EFX,
referred to as EFX0 in [29], for monotone utilities in the setting of goods. They proved that an EFX0
solution always exists when the utility functions are identical. This result yields a protocol that
produces an EFX0 allocation of goods for two players with general and possibly distinct utilities.
Barman and Murthy [8] extended their result by proving the existence of EFX0 allocations for
additive utility functions when all agents have the same preference toward goods. In a recent
paper, Chaudhury et al. [20] verified the the existence of an EFX0 solution for three agents with
monotone, additive, non-identical utilities. For monotone submodular utilities with binary marginal
gains, Benabbou et al. [10] noted that EF1 implies EFX, thus their results guarantee the existence
of EFX allocations (that are Pareto optimal as well) for any such instance. However, they showed
that even an EF1 and utilitarian optimal allocation may violate the EFX0 condition. Amanatidis
et al. [2] studied 2-value instances, that is, when there are at most two possible values for the
goods, and proved that any allocation that maximizes the Nash welfare is EFX0. They proposed
an algorithm called Match & Freeze for finding an EFX0 solution that is based on repeatedly
computing maximum matchings and freezing certain agents. Furthermore, they gave an algorithm
for instances where the utilities of each agent takes values in an interval such that the ratio between
the maximum and the minimum value is at most 2.
In general, most of the results on EFX0 allocations of goods cannot be straightforwardly trans-
lated into analogous results on allocations of chores. Therefore only a few results are known for
the setting of mixed items when both goods and chores are present. A utility function is tertiary
if u(s) ∈ {−1, 0,+1} for every s ∈ S. It is not difficult to see that for tertiary utilities EF1 implies
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EFX, thus the Double Round Robin Algorithm of [5] provides such a solution. For the same setting,
a different algorithm that provides a solution which is Pareto optimal as well was given by Alexan-
drov and Walsh [1]. They also showed that an EFX allocation can be found in polynomial time
for identical additive utilities. However, these results seems to be difficult to extend to the EFX0
case. Very recently, Chen and Liu [22] analyzed the fairness of leximin solutions in allocation of
indivisible chores. Their model contained itemwise monotone utility functions, meaning that each
agent i can partition S into sets Gi and Ci such that for any X ⊆ S we have vi(X) ≤ vi(X + s)
if s ∈ Gi and vi(X) ≥ vi(X + s) for s ∈ Ci. They verified that a leximin solution is EFX for
combinations of goods and chores for agents with identical itemwise monotone utilities. However,
their notion of EFX solutions is different from ours and so none of our results are implied by their
paper.
Gourve`s et al. [27] and Freeman et al. [25] studied equitable (EQ) allocations3 and their relax-
ations, equitable up to one good (EQ1) and equitable up to any good (EQX). Freeman et al. [26]
introduced analogous notions of (approximate) equitability of chores. By combining the results
of [27] and [26], an algorithm for finding an EQX allocation of mixed items for additive utilities is
at hand. When agents have identical valuations, an allocations satisfies EFX if and only it satisfies
EQX, thus this immediately implies the existence of an EFX allocation of mixed items for additive
identical valuations. By the protocol in [31], this result guarantees EFX allocations of mixed items
for two agents with additive (not necessarily identical) utilities.
Despite all the efforts made, the existence of an EFX/EFX0 allocation remains an intriguing
open question for at least four agents with distinct, monotone, additive utility functions.
Utilities
Additive Non-additive
Monotone Non-monotone Monotone Non-monotone
Identical
Exists [31] (goods)
Exists [27] (chores)
Exists [26,27]
Exists [31] (goods)
Exists (Thm. 3)
(chores)
Not exists (Thm. 2)
Boolean (Thm. 5)
Neg. Boolean (Thm. 6)
Non-
identical
Open
n = 3 [20]
Tertiary [5]
Open
n = 2 [26,27]
Tertiary [5]
Open
n = 2 [31] (goods)
(0, 1)-SUB [10]
n = 2 (Cor. 4)
(chores)
Not exists (Thm. 2)
Boolean (Thm. 5)
Table 2: Landscape of results on different variants of EFX allocations, where bold letters represents
the results obtained in the present paper. A utility function u is called Boolean if u(X) ∈ {0, 1}
for every X ⊆ S, and negative Boolean if −u is Boolean.
1.2 Our Results
We study the existence or non-existence of EF1 and EFX allocations for non-monotone utility
functions. Aziz et al. [5] presented a polynomial-time algorithm that returns an EF1 allocation for
arbitrary utilities, but there is a flaw in the proof (an example is described in Section 3.1). Our
first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that finds an EF1 allocation for two agents with
arbitrary (i.e. non-monotone, non-additive, non-identical) utility functions.
3An allocation pi is equitable if vi(pi(i)) = vj(pi(j)) for all agents i, j.
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Theorem 1. There always exists an EF1 allocation for two agents with arbitrary (not necessarily
monotone or additive) utility functions. Such an allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
Prior work on EFX/EFX0 allocations has mainly concentrated on the cases when all items
are either goods or chores and accordingly, the notion of EFX solutions was not defined for the
mixed setting. It turns out that finding the right generalization for non-additive, non-monotone
utility functions is not straightforward. In Section 2, we propose four possible extensions possessing
different characteristics, called EFX00, EFX
0−, EFX
+
0 , and EFX
+
−4; here EFX00 implies both EFX0−
and EFX+0 , and both EFX
0− and EFX
+
0 imply EFX
+
−. The definitions differ in whether items with
a marginal value of 0 are taken into account or not, both on the side of the envious and the envied
agents. Unfortunately, Theorem 1 does not generalize even to EFX+− allocations. This is so even
when all the utility functions are identical.
Theorem 2. There need not exist an EFX+− allocation for two agents with non-monotone, non-
additive, identical utility functions.
In the setting of goods (all utilities are non-negative), it is known [31] that EFX0 allocations
always exist for monotone identical utility functions. We show that in the setting of chores as well,
EFX+0 allocations always exist for monotone identical utility functions: note that a monotone utility
function u in the setting of chores is monotone non-increasing, i.e., X ⊆ Y implies u(X) ≥ u(Y ).
Equitable allocations (EQ) and relaxations (EQ1 and EQX) of chores were studied in [26]. It
was shown there that when all utilities are additive and identical then an EFX+− allocation always
exists. We strengthen this by showing that an EFX+0 allocation exists for all monotone identical
utility functions.
Theorem 3. When all agents have monotone (not necessarily additive) identical utility functions,
an EFX+0 allocation of chores always exists.
By using the cut-and-choose-based protocol of Plaut and Roughgarden [31], the above result
guarantees an EFX+0 allocation of chores for two agents with monotone non-identical utility func-
tions.
Corollary 4. There always exists an EFX+0 allocation of chores for two agents with monotone (not
necessarily additive) utility functions. Such an allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
As a further step towards understanding the general case, we consider special subclasses of utility
functions. Boolean utilities are non-monotone, non-additive {0, 1}-valued functions. A function u
is negative Boolean if −u is Boolean.
Theorem 5. When all agents have Boolean utility functions, an EFX0− allocation always exists.
Theorem 6. When all agents have identical negative Boolean utility functions, an EFX+0 allocation
always exists. Such an allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
Although these two statements show a lot of similarities, their proofs will be significantly differ-
ent: while the Boolean case is an easy observation, the negative Boolean case requires a somewhat
tricky approach that only works for the case of identical utility functions.
4We remark that EFX+−and EFX
0
−, when restricted to monotone, additive utilities, correspond to the usual notion
of EFX and EFX0 solutions, respectively.
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1.3 Techniques: Old and New
EF1 allocations. In the setting of goods and monotone utilities, an EF1 allocation always ex-
ists [30]. The algorithm in [30] assigns goods to bundles one-by-one, while maintaining the property
that the partial allocation constructed so far is EF1. At a general step of the algorithm, if no unen-
vied agent exists, then there exists a cycle of envy among agents, and bundles are shifted along such
cycles until no cycle of envy remains. Otherwise the next good is added to an unenvied agent. The
key observation is that although such a step might result in new envies, those can be eliminated
by removing the good she just received, so the resulting partial allocation remains EF1.
In order to find an EF1 allocation with arbitrary utilities, the Generalized Envy Graph Algo-
rithm proposed in [5] generalizes the above algorithm. The items are allocated to agents one-by-one,
always maintaining the property that the partial allocation constructed so far is EF1. In a general
step of the algorithm, the next item is added to a source vertex of the subgraph of the envy graph
spanned by the set of agents who have a non-negative marginal utility for the given item. If no
such agent exists, then the item is added to a sink vertex of the envy graph. After the addition of
the item, directed cycles of the modified envy graph are eliminated by shifting the bundles along
them. However the allocation provided by the algorithm is not necessarily EF1, even when the
utility functions are identical – we include a simple example illustrating this in Section 3.1.
In Section 3.1, we prove that an EF1 allocation always exists for n = 2 with arbitrary utilities.
More specifically, we show that for any ordering s1, . . . , sm of all the items in the entire set S, there
is an EF1 allocation pi = 〈pi(1), pi(2)〉 such that {pi(1), pi(2)} = {{s1, . . . , st}, {st+1, . . . , sm}} for
some 0 ≤ t ≤ m. This is shown by a combinatorial argument on prefixes and suffixes of the ordered
set 〈s1, . . . , sm〉. We show an example in Section 3.2 that an EFX allocation need not exist for 2
agents with non-monotone, non-additive utilities - even when the utility functions are identical.
EFX allocations. As mentioned earlier, Plaut and Roughgarden [31] showed the existence of
EFX0 allocations for monotone (non-decreasing) utilities in the setting of goods. They construct
such an allocation using the so-called leximin solution that selects the allocation which maximizes
the minimum utility, and subject to this, maximizes the second minimum utility, and so on. Our
proof of existence of EFX+0 allocations for monotone (non-increasing) utilities in the setting of
chores is different from this and is similar to the method used in [21] where another proof of the
above result from [31] was given - this method also leads to a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm
to find an EFX+0 allocation.
Our construction resembles the one in [30] to show the existence of EF1 allocations. Interest-
ingly, the construction in [30] never breaks up any bundle obtained in a partial allocation whereas
the construction in [21] and ours may need to – this is because we need to maintain an EFX allo-
cation which is more demanding than an EF1 allocation. Thus items allocated to agents in earlier
rounds may go back to the pool of unallocated items in some later round. However we show a
potential function (same as the one in [21]) that improves as our algorithm progresses – thus our
algorithm always converges. This result is given in Section 4.
The solutions for Boolean and negative Boolean utilities are based on different approaches.
While the Boolean case is an easy observation but is non-algorithmic, the negative Boolean case
is solved via a non-trivial improvement step. Our results for these special cases are given in
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. We hope that the tools used for these special cases will prove
useful in other situations as well. Finally, the main results and the most important open problems
are summarized in Section 6.
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1.4 Other Related Work
Let us further mention several results that are closely related to fair divisions of indivisible items.
Aziz et al. [6] considered an assignment problem in which agents have ordinal preferences over
objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. They introduced several
proportionality and envy-freeness concepts for discrete assignments, and gave polynomial-time al-
gorithms to check whether a fair assignment exists for several of these fairness notions. In [13],
Brams et al. discussed a problem setting with two agents who have strict rankings over an even
number of indivisible items. They proposed algorithms to find balanced allocations of these items
that maximize the minimum rank of the items that the agents receive, and are envy-free and Pareto
optimal, if such allocations exist. In [32], Plaut and Roughgarden provided a throughout descrip-
tion of the communication complexity of computing a fair allocation with indivisible goods for every
combination of fairness notion, utility function class, and number of players.
Another line of research considered group envy-freeness instead of pairs of agents. Berliant et
al. [11] generalized envy-freeness for equal-sized groups of agents. Conitzer et al. [23] introduced the
concept of group fairness, which implies most existing notions of individual fairness. They further
proposed two relaxations similar to EF1, and showed that certain local optima of the Nash welfare
function satisfy both relaxations and can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time by local search.
However, [23] assumed only goods, that is, items for which agents have positive utility. While the
notion of group fairness and group envy-freeness can be extended to the case when chores are also
present, the same does not hold for the relaxations. Aziz et al. [4] proposed fairness concepts that
are suitable to handle the case of goods and for chores as well. In the same spirit, Aziz and Rey [7]
defined several variants and relaxations of group fairness and group envy-freeness when both goods
and chores are present.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Notation
Throughout the paper, N denotes a set of n agents and S denotes a set of m indivisible items. For
simplicity, we will denote a subset of items by simply enumerating its elements without separating
them, e.g. 124 stands for the set {1, 2, 4}.
For each agent i ∈ N , a utility function ui : 2S → R is given that represents agent i’s preferences
over the subsets of items. We always assume that the empty set has value 0, that is, ui(∅) = 0 for
i ∈ N . We say that the utility functions are identical if ui(X) = uj(X) for everyX ⊆ S and i, j ∈ N ,
and non-identical if this condition does not necessarily hold. A utility function u is called additive
if u(X) =
∑
s∈X u(s) for every subset X ⊆ S, and it is monotone non-decreasing if u(X) ≤ u(Y )
whenever X ⊆ Y ; similarly, it is monotone non-increasing if u(X) ≥ u(Y ) whenever X ⊆ Y . For
simplicity, we will use non-additive and non-monotone as a shorthand for not necessarily additive
and not necessarily monotone, respectively.
The marginal utility of an item s ∈ S towards a subset X ⊆ S is denoted by u(s|X) and is
defined as u(s|X) = u(s+X)− u(X). For a set X ⊆ S and agent i, we denote by S+i (X) = {s ∈
X | ui(s|X − s) > 0}, S−i (X) = {s ∈ X | ui(s|X − s) < 0}, and S0i (X) = {s ∈ X | ui(s|X − s) = 0}
the sets of items in X whose deletion decreases, increases, and does not change the utility of agent
i on set X, respectively. We omit the index i when the utility functions are identical.
An allocation of S is a function pi : N → 2S assigning to each agent a (possibly empty) subset
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of items that altogether give a partition of S, that is, pi(i) ∩ pi(j) = ∅ for distinct i, j ∈ N and⋃
i∈N pi(i) = S. We will refer to the set pi(i) as the bundle of agent i. Agent i envies agent j if
ui(pi(i)) < ui(pi(j)). To any allocation pi, we associate a directed graph Gpi = (N,E) called the envy
graph, where there is a directed edge from i to j if agent i envies agent j for the given allocation.
2.2 Fairness in the Non-monotone, Non-additive Setting
There are several ways to characterize fairness, probably the most natural one being envy-freeness,
that requires that no agent envies another agent:
(EF) For any i, j ∈ N inequality ui(pi(i)) ≥ ui(pi(j)) holds.
Budish [16] provided a relaxation of envy-freeness by introducing the concept of envy-freeness
up to one good in the context of monotone allocations. Aziz et al. [5] extended the definition to
the non-monotone case by requiring that an agent’s envy can be eliminated by removing some item
either from her own bundle or the envied one:
(EF1) For any i, j ∈ N at least one of the following holds:
(i) ui(pi(i)) ≥ ui(pi(j))
(ii) ui(pi(i)− s) ≥ ui(pi(j)− s) for some s ∈ pi(i) ∪ pi(j).
Note that EF1 is strictly weaker than EF.
As a less permissive relaxation of envy-freeness, Caragiannis et al. [19] introduced the notion
of envy-freeness up to any good in the context of goods and monotone utilities. According to their
definition, an allocation is EFX if for any pair i, j of agents, agent i may envy agent j, however
this envy would vanish upon removing any good from j’s bundle, i.e., ui(pi(i)) ≥ ui(pi(j) − s) for
all s ∈ S+i (pi(j)). Plaut and Roughgarden [31] introduced a stronger variant called EFX0, where
the envy should vanish upon removing any good from S+i (pi(j)) ∪ S0i (pi(j)). For non-monotone,
additive utility functions with goods and chores Aziz et al. [5] proposed to call an allocation EFX
if for any pair i, j of agents, ui(pi(i)− s) ≥ ui(pi(j)− s) for any s ∈ S+i (pi(j))∪S−i (pi(i)). Note that
the latter definition does not require anything to hold for items s ∈ S with 0 marginal utility value.
Extending the definition to non-monotone, non-additive utilities is not immediate. We introduce
four variants, in descending order of strength.
(EFX00) For any i, j ∈ N at least one of the following holds:
(i) ui(pi(i)) ≥ ui(pi(j))
(ii) ui(pi(i)) ≥ ui(pi(j)− s) for every s ∈ S+i (pi(j)) ∪ S0i (pi(j)),
ui(pi(i)− s) ≥ ui(pi(j)) for every s ∈ S−i (pi(i)) ∪ S0i (pi(i)), and
S+i (pi(j)) ∪ S0i (pi(j)) ∪ S−i (pi(i)) ∪ S0i (pi(i)) 6= ∅.
It is not difficult to see that EFX00is strictly weaker than EF, but it is strictly stronger than EF1.
However, EFX00 is too much to ask for: with such a definition, the simple example with two agents
and two goods with identical additive utilities u(1) = 1 and u(2) = 0 has no EFX00 allocation. Thus
we introduce two, slightly weaker variants.
(EFX0−) For any i, j ∈ N at least one of the following holds:
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(i) ui(pi(i)) ≥ ui(pi(j))
(ii) ui(pi(i)) ≥ ui(pi(j)− s) for every s ∈ S+i (pi(j)) ∪ S0i (pi(j)),
ui(pi(i)− s) ≥ ui(pi(j)) for every s ∈ S−i (pi(i)), and
S+i (pi(j)) ∪ S0i (pi(j)) ∪ S−i (pi(i)) 6= ∅.
(EFX+0 ) For any i, j ∈ N at least one of the following holds:
(i) ui(pi(i)) ≥ ui(pi(j))
(ii) ui(pi(i)) ≥ ui(pi(j)− s) for every s ∈ S+i (pi(j)),
ui(pi(i)− s) ≥ ui(pi(j)) for every s ∈ S−i (pi(i)) ∪ S0i (pi(i)), and
S+i (pi(j)) ∪ S−i (pi(i)) ∪ S0i (pi(i)) 6= ∅.
EFX0−and EFX
+
0 are symmetric, therefore these definitions represent in a certain sense dual con-
cepts. Nevertheless, we will see that results for one of them do not automatically carry over to the
other. Note that EFX00implies both EFX
0−and EFX
+
0 .
Finally, let us introduce a further weaker condition that is the easiest to work with.
(EFX+−) For any i, j ∈ N at least one of the following holds:
(i) ui(pi(i)) ≥ ui(pi(j))
(ii) ui(pi(i)) ≥ ui(pi(j)− s) for every s ∈ S+i (pi(j)),
ui(pi(i)− s) ≥ ui(pi(j)) for every s ∈ S−i (pi(i)), and
S+i (pi(j)) ∪ S−i (pi(i)) 6= ∅.
Clearly, EFX+−is implied by both EFX0−and EFX
+
0 . For additive, monotone utility functions, EFX
introduced in [19] and EFX0 introduced in [31] are identical to EFX
+
−and EFX0−, respectively. We
further note that if s ∈ S0i (X) then ui(X − s) = ui(X). Therefore agent i cannot envy agent j
in an EFX00 or EFX
0− allocation if S0i (pi(j)) 6= ∅, and similarly, agent i cannot envy agent j in an
EFX00 or EFX
+
0 allocation if S
0
i (pi(i)) 6= ∅. In this sense, parts (i) and (ii) of definitions EFX00,
EFX0−, and EFX
+
0 describe non-disjoint situations.
In any of the above cases, if ui(pi(i)) < ui(pi(j)) for some allocation pi, then we refer to this
envy as an EFX envy if i and j satisfy the appropriate version of the second condition in EFX00–
EFX+−, otherwise it is called a non-EFX envy.
2.3 Relation to EFX and EFX0
Although the notion of EFX00 allocations seems to be reasonable, such an allocation does not
necessarily exist even in very simple examples. EFX0− allocations provide a natural extension of
the EFX0 property, and EFX
+
0 serves as a symmetric counterpart. Finally, EFX
+
− provides a
generalization of EFX allocations.
Let us explain why the non-emptiness condition in the (ii) part of the definitions is necessary.
Consider an example with two agents and two items with identical utilities, namely u(∅) = 0,
u(1) = u(2) = 2 and u(12) = 1. Then for the allocation pi(1) = ∅ and pi(2) = 12, agent 1 envies
agent 2. Then all of the sets S−1 (pi(1)), S
0
1(pi(1)), S
0
1(pi(2)), and S
+
1 (pi(2)) are empty, thus condition
(ii) without the non-emptiness assumption is a tautology in all cases. Nevertheless, the allocation
does not seem to be fair towards agent 1 in any way.
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The peculiar conditions for the non-emptiness of the corresponding sets have not arisen in
previous works for two reasons. On the one hand, earlier results mainly focused on monotone (non
decreasing) utilities. But most importantly, they mostly considered additive utilities, and in such
cases the non-emptiness conditions are redundant. Indeed, if ui(pi(i)) < ui(pi(j)) and ui is additive,
then at least one of the sets S−i (pi(i)) and S
+
i (pi(j)) is non-empty.
3 Non-monotone and Non-additive Utilities
In this section we consider arbitrary utilities. Somewhat surprisingly, an EF1 allocation always
exists for two agents and can be found in polynomial time even in this general setting; our algorithm
is presented in Section 3.1. The existence of an EFX allocation with arbitrary but identical utilities
is discussed in Section 3.2.
3.1 EF1 allocations
We now show a simple example that the allocation provided by the Generalized Envy Graph
Algorithm proposed in [5] (see Section 1.3 for an outline of this algorithm) is not necessarily EF1,
even if the utility functions are identical. Consider an instance with two agents and three items with
utilities defined as follows: u(∅) = 0, u(1) = 1, u(2) = −1, u(3) = −1, u(12) = u(13) = u(23) = 1,
and u(123) = 1. It is not difficult to check that if the items arrive in order 1, 2, 3, then this algorithm
gives pi(1) = 123 and pi(2) = ∅ as a solution. This solution is not EF1 as the deletion of any of
the items from the bundle of the first agent results in a bundle with strictly positive utility value.
Hence Theorem 2 in [5] is not correct in its present form.
That is, the existence of an EF1 allocation for non-monotone, non-additive utility functions is
still open even for identical utilities. Our first result shows that such an allocation exists for two
agents in the most general setting.
Theorem 1. There always exists an EF1 allocation for two agents with arbitrary (not necessarily
monotone or additive) utility functions. Such an allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. For an arbitrary ordering 1, . . . ,m of the items, let Fi = {1 . . . i} and Li = {i + 1 . . .m}
denote the sets of the first i and last m− i items, respectively, for i = 0, . . . ,m, where F0 = Lm = ∅.
Assume that ui(Fj) = ui(Lj) for some i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}. If u3−i(Fj) ≤ u3−i(Lj),
then let pi(i) = Fj and pi(3 − i) = Lj , else let pi(i) = Lj and pi(3 − i) = Fj . By the assumption
ui(Fj) = ui(Lj), pi is an envy-free allocation. Similarly, if there exists an index j ∈ {0, . . . ,m} such
that ui(Fj) ≥ ui(Lj) and u3−i(Fj) ≤ u3−i(Lj) for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then pi(i) = Fj , pi(3− i) = Lj is
an envy-free allocation again.
From now on we assume that neither of the above two cases holds. Thus u1(S) 6= 0. We
distinguish two cases.
Case 1. u1(S) > 0 where S is the entire set of m items.
As u1(F0) = u1(Lm) = u1(∅) = 0 and u1(Fm) = u1(L0) = u1(S) > 0, there exists an index
j ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} such that u1(Fj) < u1(Lj) and u1(Fj+1) > u1(Lj+1). By our assumption,
u2(Fj) < u2(Lj) and u2(Fj+1) > u2(Lj+1) also hold.
Subcase 1.1 u1(Fj) ≤ u1(Lj+1): set pi(1) = Lj+1 and pi(2) = Fj+1.
Subcase 1.2 u1(Fj) > u1(Lj+1): set pi(1) = Fj and pi(2) = Lj
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Figure 1: Illustration of Theorem 2. The lattice of subsets of S = {1, 2, 3}, together with the
corresponding utility value (in parenthesis).
In both subcase 1.1 and subcase 1.2, agent 1 envies agent 2’s bundle, but this envy can be
eliminated by deleting j+1 from agent 2’s bundle. This is because u1(Lj+1) ≥ u1(Fj) in subcase 1.1
and u1(Fj) > u1(Lj+1) in subcase 1.2.
Case 2. u1(S) < 0 where S is the entire set of m items.
As u1(F0) = u1(Lm) = u1(∅) = 0 and u1(L0) = u1(Fm) = u1(S) < 0, there exists an index
j ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} such that u1(Fj) > u1(Lj) and u1(Fj+1) < u1(Lj+1). By our assumption,
u2(Fj) > u2(Lj) and u2(Fj+1) < u2(Lj+1) also hold.
Subcase 2.1 u1(Fj) ≥ u1(Lj+1): set pi(1) = Fj+1 and pi(2) = Lj+1.
Subcase 2.2 u1(Fj) < u1(Lj+1): set pi(1) = Lj and pi(2) = Fj .
In both subcase 2.1 and subcase 2.2, agent 1 envies agent 2’s bundle, but this envy can be
eliminated by deleting j+1 from agent 1’s bundle. This is because u1(Fj) ≥ u1(Lj+1) in subcase 2.1
and u1(Lj+1) > u1(Fj) in subcase 2.2.
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
3.2 An Interesting Example
The difference between EF1 and EFX allocations is well illustrated by the fact that, in contrast to
the EF1 case, not even the existence of an EFX+− allocation is ensured.
Theorem 2. There need not exist an EFX+− allocation for two agents with non-monotone, non-
additive, identical utility functions.
Proof. Let S = {1, 2, 3} be a set of three items and let u : 2S → R be defined by u(∅) = 0, u(1) = 1,
u(2) = 2, u(3) = 0, u(12) = 3, u(13) = 0, u(23) = 3, and u(123) = 4 (see Figure 1). We claim that
there is no EFX+− allocation for two agents.
As the utility functions are identical, we may assume that the first agent receives more items. If
all the items are allocated to agent 1, then u1(pi(1)) = u(123) = 4 and u2(pi(2)) = u(∅) = 0, hence
agent 2 envies agent 1. However, this is a non-EFX envy as 1, 3 ∈ S+(123), but deleting either
item 1 or 3 from 123 results in a set with positive utility value.
If pi(1) = 12 and pi(2) = 3, then u1(pi(1)) = u(12) = 3 and u2(pi(2)) = u(3) = 0, hence agent 2
envies agent 1. This is a non-EFX envy as 1 ∈ S+(12), but 2 = u(2) > u(3) = 0. If pi(1) = 23 and
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pi(2) = 1, then u1(pi(1)) = u(23) = 3 and u2(pi(2)) = u(1) = 1, hence agent 2 envies agent 1. This is
a non-EFX envy as 3 ∈ S+(23), but 2 = u(2) > u(1) = 1. Finally, if pi(1) = 13 and pi(2) = 2, then
u1(pi(1)) = u(13) = 0 and u2(pi(2)) = u(2) = 2, hence agent 1 envies agent 2. This is a non-EFX
envy as 3 ∈ S−(13), but 1 = u(1) < u(2) = 2.
Remark 7. Although the utility function defined in the proof of Theorem 2 is non-monotone, it
is as close to being monotone as possible in the sense that it can be made monotone by increasing
its value on a single set (namely 13) by one. Note that an EF1 allocation exists: just set pi(1) = 13
and pi(2) = 2, then the envy of agent 1 can be eliminated by deleting 2 from pi(2).
4 EFX+0 Allocations of Chores with Identical Utilities
Envy-freeness and its relaxations have been extensively studied in the setting of indivisible goods.
A closely related problem is the fair division of chores. Here we assume every utility function ui is
monotone non-increasing, i.e., X ⊆ Y implies ui(X) ≥ ui(Y ).
Our goal is to find an EFX+0 allocation pi of S. Note that for identical monotone non-increasing
utilities this requires that
(?) for any pair of agents i, j, ui(pi(i)− s) ≥ ui(pi(j)) for all s ∈ pi(i).
We now show that such an allocation of chores always exists when (i) n = 2 or (ii) all n agents
have identical utilities. First we show the following result.
Theorem 3. When all agents have monotone (not necessarily additive) identical utility functions,
an EFX+0 allocation of chores always exists.
Proof. Our algorithm is presented as Algorithm 1. The joint utility function of the agents is
denoted by u. The algorithm runs in rounds, and we maintain a pool P of unallocated chores and
an allocation that is EFX+0 on the chores currently assigned to the agents. Initially, we set P = S.
Interestingly, chores once allocated to some agent may go back to the pool P in a later round.
Consider any round and let pi = 〈pi(1), . . . , pi(n)〉 be the EFX+0 allocation at the start of this
round and let pi′ = 〈pi′(1), . . . , pi′(n)〉 be the EFX+0 allocation at the end of this round. Let P (resp.,
P ′) be the set of unallocated chores at the start (resp., end) of this round. We will ensure that at
least one of the following two conditions is satisfied:
(i) |P ′| < |P | and ∑i∈N u(pi′(i)) ≤∑i∈N u(pi(i))), i.e., the number of allocated chores increases
in this round and utilitarian welfare does not increase,
(ii)
∑
i∈N u(pi
′(i)) <
∑
i∈N u(pi(i))), i.e., utilitarian welfare strictly decreases in this round.
In other words, in each round of our algorithm, we either decrease utilitarian welfare or we increase
the number of allocated chores without increasing utilitarian welfare. We now describe a single
round in detail.
Since all agents have the same utilities, the agents can be ordered in terms of the utilities of
their bundles. So at any point in time, there is at least one agent who can be called a happiest
agent: one who does not envy any other agent. In each round, we pick any unallocated chore s and
add s to the bundle of a happiest agent (call this agent k). There are two cases:
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Case 1. Suppose 〈pi(1), . . . , pi(k)+s, . . . , pi(n)〉 is EFX+0 . Then set pi′(k) = pi(k)+s and pi′(i) = pi(i)
for i 6= k. Observe that the allocation pi′ = 〈pi′(1), . . . , pi′(n)〉 satisfies condition (i) given above.
Case 2. Suppose 〈pi(1), . . . , pi(k) + s, . . . , pi(n)〉 is not EFX+0 . By observation (?), u(pi(k) + s −
s′) < u(pi(`)) for some s′ ∈ pi(k) and ` ∈ N . Thus we can find an inclusionwise minimal subset
pi′(k) ⊂ pi(k) + s such that pi′(k) is an envious bundle, i.e., u(pi′(k)) < u(pi(`)) for some ` ∈ N .
Since pi′(k) is a minimal envious subset of pi(k) + s, for every X ⊂ pi′(k), we have u(X) ≥ u(pi(i))
for all i ∈ N .
Now the chores in (pi(k)+s)\pi′(k) are thrown back into the pool P , i.e., P ′ = P∪(pi(k)+s)\pi′(k).
Let pi′(i) = pi(i) for all i 6= k.
Claim 8. The allocation pi′ = 〈pi′(1), . . . , pi′(n)〉 is an EFX+0 allocation.
Proof. We need to show that u(pi′(i)−r) ≥ u(pi′(j)) for all i, j ∈ N and r ∈ pi′(i). Since pi′(t) = pi(t)
for all t 6= k and pi is EFX+0 , for all i, j such that neither i nor j is k, this holds.
When i = k: Since pi′(k) is a minimal envious subset of pi(k) + s, we have u(pi′(k) − r) ≥
u(pi(j)) = u(pi′(j)) for all r ∈ pi′(k) and j 6= k.
When j = k: We claim that u(pi′(k)) < u(pi(k)). Indeed, u(pi′(k)) < u(pi(`)) for some ` ∈ [n]
since pi′(k) is envious, and u(pi(`)) ≤ u(pi(k)) for all ` ∈ [n] since k is a happiest agent in pi. Thus
for any i 6= k, we have u(pi′(i)− r) = u(pi(i)− r) ≥ u(pi(k)) > u(pi′(k)) for all r ∈ pi′(i), where the
inequality u(pi(i)− r) ≥ u(pi(k)) follows from pi being EFX+0 .
Since u(pi′(k)) < u(pi(k)) and pi′(t) = pi(t) for all t 6= k, ∑i∈[n] u(pi′(i)) <∑i∈[n] u(pi(i))). Thus
the allocation pi′ = 〈pi′(1), . . . , pi′(n)〉 satisfies condition (ii) given above.
Note that there can be at most |S| consecutive rounds where condition (i) holds. After that
either all chores are allocated or there is a round where condition (ii) holds, i.e., utilitarian welfare
strictly decreases. Thus the number of rounds is at most |S|/∆ where ∆ = min{|u(X) − u(Y )| :
X,Y ⊆ S and u(X) 6= u(Y )} is the minimum difference between distinct utilities. Therefore our
algorithm always terminates, concluding the proof of the theorem.
The cut-and-choose protocol of Plaut and Roughgarden [31] implies the following corollary.
Corollary 4. There always exists an EFX+0 allocation of chores for two agents with monotone (not
necessarily additive) utility functions. Such an allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let u1 and u2 be the utility functions of agent 1 and agent 2, respetively. By Theorem 3,
there exists an EFX+0 allocation when the utility function of both agents is u1. Take such an
allocation; this defines a partition of S into two parts S1 and S2. Now let the second agent choose
among S1 and S2 based on her preferences. Clearly, agent 2 will have no envy as she chooses the
set with better utility with respect to u2. On the other hand, even if agent 1 envies agent 2, this
is an EFX+0 envy due to the construction of the allocation.
5 Boolean and Negative Boolean Utility Functions
In this section we consider special cases of non-identical utility functions: Boolean and negative
Boolean utilities.
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Algorithm 1 Finding an EFX+0 allocation of chores for monotone, identical utility functions.
Input: Set N of agents, set S of items, monoton utility function u : 2S → R−.
Output: An EFX+0 allocation.
1: Let P := S.
2: Set pi(i) := ∅ for i ∈ N .
3: while P is not empty do
4: Pick an unallocated chore s ∈ P .
5: Pick a happiest agent k.
6: if (pi(1), . . . , pi(k) + s, . . . , pi(n)) is EFX+0 then
7: pi(k)← pi(k) + s
8: P ← P − s
9: else
10: Let X ⊂ pi(k) + s be inclusionwise minimal s.t. u(X) < u(pi(l)) for some l ∈ N .
11: pi(k)← X
12: P ← P ∪ (pi(k) + s) \X
13: return pi.
5.1 Boolean Utilities
Recall that a utility function u is called Boolean if u(X) ∈ {0, 1} for X ⊆ S.
Theorem 5. When all agents have Boolean utility functions, an EFX0− allocation always exists.
Proof. We construct an EFX0− solution by assigning bundles to agents one-by-one using Algo-
rithm 2. After each step, we will refer to unassigned items and to agents without bundles as
remaining items and agents, respectively.
At a general step of the algorithm, we take an inclusionwise minimal subset X of the remaining
items that has utility value 1 for at least one of the remaining agents, and we assign X to one of
the agents i with ui(X) = 1. If no such set exists, then we pick an arbitrary agent i and set X to
be the empty set. Then we delete the members of X from S and i from N . When only one agent
remains, we assign the remaining set of items to her.
We claim that the solution thus obtained is an EFX0− allocation. We may assume that
the order of the agents in which their bundles get fixed is 1, . . . , n. Note that the sequence
u1(pi(1)), . . . , un(pi(n)) is monotone decreasing, that is, it consists of a sequence of 1’s followed
by a sequence of 0’s (any of these two parts can be empty). Therefore if agent i envies j, then
j < i, ui(pi(j)) = 1, and ui(pi(i)) = 0. However, by the choice of pi(j) in Step 3 of the algorithm,
ui(pi(j)− s) = 0 for every s ∈ pi(j). Moreover, S+i (pi(j)) 6= ∅ and the statement follows.
Note that an EFX+0 allocation does not necessarily exist for Boolean allocations. To see this,
consider the instance with three items and two agents with identical utilities defined as follows:
u(X) = 0 if |X| ≤ 1 and u(X) = 1 otherwise. It is not difficult to verify that no allocation satisfies
the conditions of EFX+0 .
Remark 9. The proof of Theorem 5 is non-algorithmic, as Step 3 of Algorithm 2 asks for an
inclusionwise minimal set with utility value 1 for at least one of the remaining agents. Of course
the complexity of finding such a set depends on how the utility functions are given, but the difficulty
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Algorithm 2 Finding an EFX0− allocation for Boolean utility functions.
Input: Set N of agents, set S of items, utility functions ui : 2
S → {0,+1}.
Output: An EFX0− allocation.
1: while |N | ≥ 2 do
2: if there exist i ∈ N and X ⊆ S s.t. ui(X) = 1 then
3: Let X ⊆ S be inclusionwise minimal s.t. ui(X) = 1 for some i ∈ N . Let i be an agent
with ui(X) = 1. Set pi(i) := X.
4: N ← N − i
5: S ← S −X
6: else
7: Let i ∈ N arbitrary. Set pi(i) := ∅.
8: N ← N − i
9: For the only remaining agent j in N , set pi(j) := S.
10: return pi
is well illustrated by the fact that the problem is equivalent to determining a satisfying assignment
of a Boolean function using a minimum number of true variables.
One of the most common representations of Boolean functions are conjunctive normal forms
(CNFs), the conjunctions of clauses which are elementary disjunctions of literals. A CNF is called
pure Horn if every clause in it contains exactly one positive literal, and a Boolean function is pure
Horn if it admits a pure Horn CNF representation. Pure Horn functions form a fundamental sub-
class of Boolean functions admitting interesting structural and computational properties. Among
others, SAT is solvable for this class in linear time [24].
If each utility function ui is represented by a pure Horn CNF, then a set X satisfying the
conditions of Step 3 can be determined in polynomial time with the help of the the so-called
forward chaining procedure. For further details, we refer the interested reader to [28].
5.2 Negative Boolean Utilities
Recall that a utility function u is called negative Boolean if −u is Boolean.
Theorem 6. When all agents have identical negative Boolean utility functions, an EFX+0 allocation
always exists. Such an allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. The algorithm is presented as Algorithm 3. The joint utility function of the agents is denoted
by u. We start with an arbitrary allocation, say, pi(1) = S and pi(i) = ∅ otherwise. In a general
step of the algorithm, we pick a pair i, j ∈ N of agents such that there is a non-EFX envy from
i to j. As we are considering EFX+0 allocations and the utility function is negative Boolean, this
means that there exists an item s ∈ pi(i) such that −1 = u(pi(i)) = u(pi(i)− s) < u(pi(j)) = 0. The
algorithm moves such an item from the bundle of agent i to that of agent j.
It suffices to show that the algorithm terminates after a polynomial number of steps. Recall
that the numbers of agents and items are denoted by n and m, respectively. Define
ϕ(pi) = m ·
∑
i∈N
u(pi(i))=−1
1 +
∑
i∈N
u(pi(i))=0
|pi(i)|.
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In other words, ϕ counts m times the number of agents with utility value −1, plus the total number
of items in bundles having utility value 0.
Claim 10. ϕ(pi)) strictly increases throughout the algorithm.
Proof. Let pi′ denote the allocation obtained from pi by moving s from pi(i) to pi(j), that is, pi′(i) =
pi(i) − s, pi′(j) = pi(j) + s, pi′(k) = pi(k) otherwise. By u(pi(i)) = −1, we have pi(i) 6= ∅ and so
|pi(j)| ≤ m− 1.
If u(pi′(j)) = −1, then
ϕ(pi′) = m ·
∑
i∈N
u(pi′(i))=−1
1 +
∑
i∈N
u(pi′(i))=0
|pi′(i)|
≥ m ·

 ∑
i∈N
u(pi(i))=−1
1
+ 1
+
 ∑
i∈N
u(pi(i))=0
|pi(i)| − (m− 1)

= m ·
∑
i∈N
u(pi(i))=−1
1 +
∑
i∈N
u(pi(i))=0
|pi(i)|+ 1
= ϕ(pi) + 1,
while if u(pi′(j)) = 0, then
ϕ(pi′) = m ·
∑
i∈N
u(pi′(i))=−1
1 +
∑
i∈N
u(pi′(i))=0
|pi′(i)|
= m ·
∑
i∈N
u(pi(i))=−1
1 +
∑
i∈N
u(pi(i))=0
|pi(i)|+ 1
= ϕ(pi) + 1.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
As ϕ takes integer values upper bounded by m·n, Claim 10 implies that the algorithm terminates
after a polynomial number of steps, and the theorem follows.
Note that an EFX0− allocation does not necessarily exist for negative Boolean allocations. To
see this, consider the instance with three items and two agents with identical utilities defined as
follows: u(X) = 0 if |X| ≤ 1 and u(X) = −1 otherwise. It is not difficult to verify that no allocation
satisfies the conditions of EFX0−.
Remark 11. A natural adaptation of Algorithm 2 to the negative Boolean setting would be to
always choose an inclusionwise minimal subset of the remaining items in Step 3 that has −1 utility
value. However, such an approach has no control over the set that is allocated to the last agent,
and so a non-EFX envy might be present.
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Algorithm 3 Finding an EFX+0 allocation for identical negative Boolean utility functions.
Input: Set N of agents, set S of items, utility function u : 2S → {0,−1}.
Output: An EFX+0 allocation.
1: Set pi(1) := S and pi(i) = ∅ otherwise.
2: while pi is not EFX+0 do
3: Let i, j ∈ N s.t. u(pi(i)) < u(pi(j)) and the envy is non-EFX.
4: Choose s ∈ pi(i) such that u(pi(i)− s) < u(pi(j)).
5: pi(i)← pi(i)− s
6: pi(j)← pi(j) + s
7: return pi
6 Conclusions
The present paper focused on the concept of envy-freeness and its relaxations, envy-freeness up to
one item and envy-freeness up to any item. Concerning EF1 allocations, we presented a polynomial-
time algorithm for finding one for two agents with arbitrary utility functions. We extended the
notion of EFX allocations to non-monotone, non-additive utilities, and settled the existence or
non-existence of such solutions in various settings. We showed that an EFX+0 allocation of chores
always exists for monotone identical utility functions. For the classes of Boolean and identical
negative Boolean utilities, we verified the existence of EFX0− and EFX
+
0 allocations, respectively.
Tables 1 and 2 show that the existence or non-existence of a fair solution is still open in many
cases. Among them, we would like to draw attention to two open problems that seem to be
particularly interesting.
Question 12. Does there always exist an EF1 allocation for non-monotone, non-additive, identical
utility functions?
Question 13. Does there always exist an EFX+− allocation for monotone, additive, non-identical
utility functions?
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